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The PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM VIETNAM

Room 1656 NS



A I D
Reference Center
Room 1656 NS

OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY
U S AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

SAIGON, VIETNAM
1966

PD-ABP-940

THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM

UNITED STATES AGENCY
For
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Saigon, Vietnam

CHARLES A MANN
DIRECTOR, USAID/VIETNAM

ROBERTC LOWE
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR PUBLIC SAFETY

Saigon
1 April 1966


FOREWORD

The purpose of this pamphlet is to provide a brief narrative description of the objectives, activities and accomplishments of the Office of Public Safety of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission in Vietnam, as they were at the beginning of calendar year 1966

The pamphlet is intended primarily for the use of United States civilian or military advisors in Vietnam whose effectiveness may be enhanced by a general knowledge of the work of the National Police and other law enforcement agencies and of the role of the Office of Public Safety in supporting and developing those agencies. It is also available as a ready reference for members of the working press and others with a serious interest in Vietnam. It is not intended as a program justification nor is it a manual for Public Safety Advisors.

It is hoped that the information provided here will be useful and that it will promote a spirit of cooperation and mutual helpfulness.

The task of civil policing and law enforcement, particularly under the present difficult circumstances, is so overwhelming that the National Police and the Office of Public Safety need, and ask, the sympathetic understanding and wholehearted support of everyone in Vietnam.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Robert C. Lowe". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Robert" being more prominent and the last name "Lowe" following in a similar style.

Robert C. Lowe, Assistant Director
USAID Mission in Vietnam

1 April 1966



Robert C Lowe
Assistant Director for Public Safety



Philip D Batson
Deputy Assistant Director for Public Safety



Maynard N Shirven - Chief, Finance and Logistics Division



Charles E O'Brien - Chief, Operations Division



Elmer E Adkins, Jr
Chief, Administration and Support Division
(Transferred from Vietnam, April 1966)

NATIONAL POLICE



DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE
(RANK CONTROLLER GENERAL)



DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL
(RANK CONTROLLER)



COMMISSIONER PRINCIPAL



COMMISSIONER CAREER



COMMISSIONER DAILY STATUS



REDACTOR PRINCIPAL



REDACTOR DAILY STATUS



INSPECTOR PRINCIPAL



INSPECTOR CAREER



INSPECTOR DAILY STATUS



ASSISTANT INSPECTOR PRINCIPAL



ASSISTANT INSPECTOR CAREER



ASSISTANT INSPECTOR DAILY STATUS

INTRODUCTION

The civil police of the Republic of Vietnam are organized on a national basis, i.e., there are no local police forces such as are found in the United States, except for some village constables who are largely untrained and operate at a very low level.

The police organization is known as the Directorate General of National Police, ~~or~~, for the sake of simplicity, as the National Police. It is headed by a Director General under whom are a Deputy Director, seven Assistant Directors for, respectively, Administration, Personnel and Training, Intelligence, Operations, Resources Control, Field Force, and Scientific Police. ^{1/}

There are six National Police Regional Directorates, designated and located as follows:

North Central Lowlands	Hue
South Central Lowlands	Nha Trang
Central Highlands	Ban Me Thuot
Eastern	Bien Hoa
Upper Mekong	My Tho
Lower Mekong	Can Tho

^{1/} The Directorate General of National Police was established on June 27, 1962, with the signing of a decree by the President of the Republic of Vietnam. Prior to that date there were many separate police agencies operating throughout the country, without essential coordination and without the unity of effort that is particularly necessary to meet the widespread threat to national security posed by the Viet Cong and their foreign allies and supporters.

The boundaries of the Regions are shown in the map on page 9. In addition, there is the Saigon Municipal Police Directorate (SMPD), which reports directly to National Police Headquarters in Saigon. The SMPD includes in its jurisdiction the neighboring province of Gia Dinh. All the other provinces and autonomous cities are grouped into one or another of the six Regions. Each of the Regions and the Saigon Municipal Police Directorate has an appointed Regional or Municipal Chief of Police.

In each Province and Autonomous City there is a Provincial Chief of Police or, as the case may be, a Municipal Chief of Police. Provinces are divided into districts, each of which has a Chief of Police.


The administrative chain of command of the National Police is from Headquarters to Region to Province to District. This encompasses such matters as police policy and doctrine, personnel administration, including recruitment, pay, promotion and transfer, training, technical standards, budgets and finance, equipment and supply, and like functions. Administration is highly centralized, there being comparatively little delegation of authority to the field. In this respect there is great similarity to the French system of administration and therefore considerable divergence from the American system.

In practice the operational chain of command is the same as the administrative chain, although as a matter of Government regulation each Province and District Chief* is responsible for law enforcement in his own area. These regulations date from the Diem regime and have never been revised. Of necessity there is greater delegation of authority in operational than in administrative matters.

* Note: The Province Chief and the District Chief are not to be confused with the Province Chief of Police and the District Chief of Police. When the latter are meant in this pamphlet, their full titles are used.

USOM/PSD REGIONAL POLICE AREAS

MAP Nº	PROVINCE NAME	REGION	MAP Nº	PROVINCE NAME	REGION
1	QUANG TRI	LOWLANDS NORD	35	AN GIANG	PI
2	THUA THIEN		40	AN XUYEN	VI
3	QUANG NAM		39	BA XUYEN	PI
4	QUANG TIN		26	BIEN HOA	IV
5	QUANG NGAI	LOWLANDS SOUTH			II
6	BINH DINH		19		IV
7	PHU YEN		10		II
8	KHANH HOA		24		IV
9	NINH THUA	HIGHLANDS	38	CHUONG THIEM	VI
10	BINH THUAN		41	CON SON	
11	KONTUM		14	DARLAC	III
12	PLEIKU		31	DINH TUONG	P
13	PHUBON	EASTERN REGION	27	GIA DINH	IV
14	DARLAC		8	KHANH HOA	II
15	QUANG DUC		36	KIEN GIANG	VI
16	TUYEN DUC		32	KIEN HOA	V
17	LAM DONG	PER MEKONG REGION	10	KIEN PHONG	V
18	PHUOC LONG		29	KIEN TUONG	V
19	BINH LONG		11	KONTUM	III
20	TAY NINH		17	LAM DONG	III
21	BINH DUONG	WEL MEKONG REGION	23	LONG AN	P
22	PHUOC THANH		23	LONG KHANH	IV
23	LONG KHANH		1	NINH THUAN	II
24	BINH TUY		31	PHONG DINH	VI
25	PHUOC TUY	UPPER MEKONG REGION	11	PHU BON	III
26	BIEN HOA		11	PHUOC LONG	IV
27	GIA DINH		2	PHUOC THANH	IV
28	LONG AN		2	PHUOC TUY	IV
29	KIEN TUONG	LOWER MEKONG REGION	1	PHU YEN	II
30	KIEN PHONG		1	PLEIKU	III
31	DINH TUONG		15	QUANG DUC	III
32	KIEN HOA		3	QUANG NAM	I
33	VINH BINH	SOUTH	5	QUANG NGAI	I
34	VINH LONG		4	QUANG TIN	I
35	AN GIANG		1	QUANG TRI	I
36	KIEN GIANG		20	TAY NINH	IV
37	PHONG DINH	SVN EAST	2	THUA THIEN	I
38	CHUONG THIEM		16	TUYEN DUC	III
39	BA XUYEN		33	VINH BINH	VI
40	AN XUYEN		34	VINH LONG	VI



The Province Chief is also the military (Sector) commander in the Province and as such reports to the Corps Commander. Police operations are routinely coordinated with military operations through this channel.


The Province Chiefs report through civil channels to the Ministry of Interior, in which the Directorate General of National Police is located organizationally. (An organization chart of the Ministry of Interior is on page 11. The organization of the National Police is shown on page 12.

From a force level of 22,000 in mid-1964 the National Police had reached 52,000 by the end of 1965 and a further increase of 20,000 is planned for 1966, with a target strength of 72,000 by the end of 1966. As would be expected, this large and rapid expansion has brought in its wake a host of problems, with which the police and the Office of Public Safety are struggling jointly. This pamphlet outlines our joint efforts.

The Assistant Director of USAID for Public Safety is the principal advisor of the Director General, National Police, or, in bureaucratic parlance, they are counterparts. Similarly, each of the USAID Regional Police Advisors has as his counterpart the appropriate Regional Director of the National Police and each USAID Provincial Police Advisor has as his counterpart the Provincial Chief of Police. Nearly all other public safety advisors also have counterparts within the National Police hierarchy or in one of the other organizations supported under the public safety program, namely, the Combined Telecommunications Directorate of the Ministry of Interior, the Directorate General, Prison Rehabilitation (Ministry of Interior) and the Customs Directorate General (Ministry of Finance).

As of January 1966 the Office of Public Safety was authorized to have 160 professional advisors, of whom approximately 100 were on board. Additionally six British and one Australian police advisors are on loan to the Office of Public Safety to assist in project implementation.

ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR



PRIMEMINISTER


WAR & REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT GROUP

Autonomous Cities

- Hue
- Da Nang
- Cam Ranh
- Da Lat
- Vung Tau

(+) (Also Police representation in some Villages & Hamlets)

- 12 -





Results of V C terrorist bombings in Saigon





V C terrorist bombings such as these are
investigated by National Police



OBJECTIVES OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM

General

In ordinary circumstance the principal functions of the civil police forces of a state are to maintain law and order, to protect the lives and property of persons within its borders, to detect and suppress such illegal activities as subversion and incipient insurgency, and to perform various regulatory functions, ranging from traffic control to the control of the movement of persons and goods across or within its borders and the protection of the currency. The National Police of Vietnam have all these functions, and in addition they must currently support and assist the military and paramilitary forces in suppressing the Viet Cong insurgency, which derives much of its military strength and support from outside the borders of South Vietnam.

To oppose, seek out and destroy the military forces of the Viet Cong is the function of the military forces of Vietnam and its allies. In their supporting role, the police must gather intelligence on Viet Cong clandestine operations and movements, must maintain public order in urban areas and in rural areas that have been pacified by the military, including the control of small irregular forces which may remain behind or may re-infiltrate, and must control the movement of men and material into and out of Viet Cong hands.

The National Police as presently constituted are not capable of fulfilling their responsibilities in toto. They are understrength and, owing to the rapid expansion since 1964, they are for the most part inadequately trained. Frequent changes in command associated with the series of coups have had an adverse effect on management and administration. Inadequacies in police jurisdiction at times render the police ineffective. Specifically, it is believed that the Viet Cong receive a large part of their equipment and supplies, including arms and ammunition, through illegal traffic within Government-controlled areas, especially the Saigon Area. It is known that Viet Cong personnel sometimes infiltrate Government areas dressed in ARVN uniform and thus


acquire at least partial immunity for their illicit operations. These are deficiencies that must be remedied in order to make police more effective.

A major objective of the Office of Public Safety is to develop the National Police into a modern professional law enforcement organization capable of maintaining law and order and of constituting an effective first line of defense against subversion, insurgency and guerrilla activities. The National Police will be trained and equipped to a level where they can cope with guerrilla operations short of those by organized units employing military discipline and tactics and essentially military-type weapons and where they can hold areas cleared by the military, thus enabling the later to concentrate on offensive action against the military main force units of the Viet Cong. Concurrently, the capability of the National Police will be strengthened so that they can control civil disturbances with a minimum of violence and cope with common crime in a manner befitting a modern state. These targets are closely inter-related, i.e., the efficient performance of normal police functions tends to prevent crimes associated with insurgency.

The current priority objective of the police, as of the entire Government of Vietnam, is to crush the Viet Cong insurgency. To this end, intensive efforts are being devoted to improvement of police intelligence and to such special functions as resources control and counter-terrorist operations and to the development of the Police Field Forces--essentially a constabulary type of police organization--while at the same time stepping up training and high-level managerial advice to the police.

Specific Objectives

--- Support the expansion of the National Police to 72,000 men by the end of 1966 by providing essential equipment and supplies not otherwise available and also by providing budgetary support to the extent that the accelerated expansion is beyond the current financial capability of the Government of Vietnam.



Louis J Poudre - Senior Advisor, Logistics and
Tran Van Son, Logistics Technician



James F Gorman, Jack M Forcey - Research and
Reporting Officers and Nguyen Ngoc Cam,
Administrative Assistant to Assistant Director

--- Strengthen the operational capability of the Provincial and District police organization , particularly with respect to counter-insurgency operations

--- Assist the National Police to establish and train a tactical police field force consisting of small, highly mobile, lightly armed units capable of

a Controlling a low level of armed insurgency and banditry, wherever it occurs,

b Protecting resources control operations against guerrilla action,

c Supporting other Government agencies in the "holding" phase of the pacification program and rooting out VC infrastructure in Government-controlled territory,

d Interdicting VC lines of communication into and out of pacified areas,

e Collecting intelligence by watching trails and waterways and by reconnaissance patrols,

f Reinforcing police posts which come under attack

--- Assist the National Police to regulate the movement of selected resources, both human and material, in order to restrict support of the Viet Cong or deprive them of it altogether and to interrupt and destroy VC non-military communications More specifically, the objective is to intercept and detain known or suspected members of the VC and other persons who may be engaged in transporting intelligence or supplies to the VC, to interdict materiel going out of Government controlled territory which would be of value to the VC, including food, medical supplies and petroleum products, and to seize contraband materials, e g , explosives, entering or being transported within Government-controlled territory

--- Improve the police records and identification system, which is basic to all police work

--- Enhance the capability of the Saigon Municipal Police Directorate to perform effectively, normal metropolitan police functions, including traffic control, and improve the effectiveness of counter-insurgency measures

--- Assist the National Police to provide adequate recruit and refresher training to all members of the National Police and to provide advanced training for selected personnel

--- Assist the National Police to select, equip and fully train police personnel in civil disturbance control, so that the police will have the capability of coping with riots and other civil disturbances in accordance with modern humane methods and with a minimum level of force

--- Enable the Combined Telecommunications Directorate to establish, operate and maintain nation-wide integrated telecommunication facilities, systems and services for the National Police and other civil security agencies in direct support of the counterinsurgency effort, civil security, rural construction and the preservation of law and order

--- Support the Customs Service by providing equipment and supplies essential for its modernization (Administrative and procedural reforms are the responsibility of the Assistant Director for Special Projects)


--- Assist the Directorate General of Prison Rehabilitation to establish an adequate system of prisoner confinement and re-education

PUBLIC SAFETY ACTIVITIES

Support of Expansion of the National Police


To support a police force of the size needed in present circumstances is beyond the present limited economic and financial capabilities of the Government of Vietnam. Accordingly, in view of our mutuality of interest, the USAID has undertaken to supplement Vietnamese resources with American, as part of the economic aid program. The assistance provided is financial, material and technical.

OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY







Weapons Maintenance Advisors Samuel P. Beverlin and Joseph A. Sobotta at their office in N P Headquarters, Saigon



Advisor Sobotta teaching N P weapons maintenance men the operating of the gun bluing machines at N P Headquarters



Logistics Advisor Lowell E Diamond checking U S A I D
commodities to be delivered to N P



Logistics Advisor Walter E Swarthout supervising loading
of concertina wire for delivery to National Police

The provision of direct budgetary assistance on a significant scale is an innovation in 1966, made necessary by the large increase in the police strength at a time of severe budgetary stringency, the latter brought about by a government policy of budgetary austerity as a counter-inflationary measure. Direct financial grants and release of counterpart funds ranging from ten to thirty or thirty-five per cent of the overall police budget may be made in 1966. To the extent they are made, they will be used to pay the costs of the 20,000-man expansion and to provide funds for repair and rehabilitation of essential facilities and a minimum of necessary new construction.

It is also necessary to equip the police in order that they may operate effectively. The principal items of equipment furnished on a force-wide basis are small arms and vehicles. The basic police weapon is the .38 calibre revolver, one of which is furnished for every man in the force (except for Field Force personnel). In addition, forty per cent of the men are furnished carbines, twenty per cent submachine guns, ten per cent 12 gauge shotguns and two per cent BAR's. Except for the revolvers, these weapons are normally kept in the police armories and are issued daily as required. Some other weapons are provided for special purposes, and the Field Forces have their own table of weapons.

Ammunition is furnished on the basis of a table of standard allowances, which will be modified as experience is gained. USAID has provided a reloading plant for .38 calibre wadcutter (training) cartridges. This will result in considerable savings in ammunition costs, in fact, no more wadcutter ammunition is being procured.

Vehicles are furnished on a basis of three per 100 police, with some exceptions made for the Field Forces and certain other special units. The vehicles furnished are 1/4-ton trucks (jeeps) and 1 1/2-ton trucks, in the ratio of three to one. One third of the jeeps and all the 1 1/2-ton trucks have four-wheel drive. In addition, 148 five-ton trucks have been furnished.

The vehicle fleet is rapidly being standardized, in order to facilitate maintenance and repair and to minimize spare parts inventories. Arrangements have been made to obtain spare parts from a U S depot in Japan on instantaneous requisitions (Milstrip), thus effecting maximum economy both in inventories and in time lost by deadlining.

Recently (FY-66) USAID has agreed to assist by furnishing items of individual clothing and equipment. Substantial quantities of uniforms have been and will be supplied, as well as boots and certain other individual items. It is planned to equip a police clothing factory (primarily with cutting and power sewing machines), thus effecting economies in supply of clothing. A shoe factory is also under consideration.

In order to improve the security of police installations, large amounts of sandbags, barbed wire and concertina wire have been furnished. In addition, cement and roofing materials are being supplied to meet urgent requirements. Provision of these latter is a form of budgetary support which makes possible various high priority projects that otherwise could not be undertaken by the police because of fiscal limitations.

Because of security conditions in the countryside, it has been impossible to effect the normal distribution of equipment and supplies by rail and road. Accordingly USAID has provided air transportation on a regular basis for police material and occasionally for personnel. Air service requirements are under study with a view to a long-range solution.

Technical advice has been and is being furnished on a continuing basis on a wide range of administrative and managerial problems. These include such fundamental matters as the organization of the National Police, the rules and procedures of the police, force levels, logistics systems, and, for the future, personnel administration.

In 1965 a joint study of the organization of the headquarters of the National Police was conducted over a period of several months and


recommendations for reorganization were submitted to the Director General. Similarly, a joint study of the regulations and procedures of the police was initiated and the draft of the first of three projected volumes of a manual of procedures and standing orders, including control of expenditures, was submitted to the Director General. This study is scheduled for completion by January 1967 and should lead to the promulgation of a complete code of procedures and standing orders for the police. No such code exists at the present time and the lack is grievously felt. A new police decree, establishing the National Police and providing for its discipline, has been drafted and is awaiting promulgation. A codification of the laws is also urgently required, but this arduous task has not yet been undertaken.

A consolidated Logistics Service was created in National Police Headquarters in 1965 and USAID undertook to give it technical support. This involves technical advice in logistics planning, supply and distribution techniques, stock records systems, warehousing, maintenance systems for vehicles, boats and weapons, and the establishment and operation of maintenance shops. A very close working relationship, based on mutual dependence, has developed between the police Logistics Service and the Logistics Unit of the Office of Public Safety, with their combined efforts resulting in increasingly effective supply and maintenance operations.


Support of Police Field Operations

In a sense, of course, all non-headquarters operations are field operations, and in that sense ninety per cent of the National Police operations are in the field. Here, however, we are talking about the operations of Regional, Provincial and District police headquarters. These are supported by USAID with technical advice and equipment and supplies, and indirectly, through the budget, with funds.

It is planned to station a Public Safety Advisor in each Regional, Provincial and autonomous city police headquarters. As of April 1966, there was an advisor in each of the six regional headquarters and there



Third Precinct N P personnel being briefed on plans for a night Family Census operation at Precinct Headquarters



Vincent E Young, Advisor to Saigon Municipal Police Third Precinct, offering advice to Third Precinct Chief and clerk on proper index procedures for police records



Saigon Municipal Police on a night-time
Family Census checking operation



A gambling den raided by Saigon Municipal Police

were 31 Advisors distributed among the 43 provinces and autonomous cities, exclusive of Saigon Obviously most of these Advisors were serving more than one headquarters, another 17 were required for complete staffing, and these were arriving at a good rate as recruited and trained

The various field headquarters are lacking in transportation and are seriously deficient in up-to-date office equipment, such as typewriters and duplicating machines Some of these deficiencies will be made up in 1966 and it is planned to continue this kind of support in future years As a matter of principle we consider that field offices should be at least as well equipped, in relation to need, as the National Headquarters

The physical facilities - office buildings, police stations and official quarters - have not expanded significantly with the increase in the numbers of policemen, with the result that they are now, by and large, grossly inadequate, with a resulting deleterious effect on efficiency and morale While there is a shortage of resources, both fiscal and physical, we propose to do what we can to ameliorate the situation An urgent need is a long-range plan of construction, with priorities clearly identified We shall work jointly with the police to develop this

Support of Police Field Forces

Concept

The war has produced several attempts at area pacification In each of these a consistent pattern has emerged of inability to provide permanent local security within which civil development may take place

The reason for this weakness lies in a gap between the roles and missions of the Armed Forces, including the Regional and Popular Forces, and the ordinary National Police The gap is not apparent, of course, while the Army (ARVN) is present and is conducting clearing operations, However, when the ARVN has completed its clearing

operation and is redeployed elsewhere, military responsibilities devolve upon the Regional Forces and the Popular Forces. It then becomes necessary, in the view of most Province Chiefs and District Chiefs under whose control these forces lie, to employ them largely for the protection of the provincial and district capitals.

The result is that the villages and hamlets scheduled for the final stages of "hold" operations and the social developments associated with pacification are left without continuous protection against the re-emerging village guerrillas. These small groups of VC thugs then terrorise the hamlet dwellers, undisturbed.

Eradication of the village guerrillas, elimination of the VC infrastructure, and resources control are the essential and interlocking components of "hold" operations which can only be finally effective when conducted at village/hamlet level.

The existence of this gap in roles and missions was appreciated, and the Mission Council supported a GVN decision to fill it with an appropriate component of the National Police. This was confirmed by decree in January 1965.

The decision to use police had a two-fold origin. First, in examining solutions to similar problems elsewhere, the pattern set by the Police Field Force in Malaya, working as the arm of Special Branch Intelligence, was found to be closely related to that of the older US-sponsored Philippine Constabulary. Both handled this type of problem with conspicuous success and thereby established relevant precedents. Second, a need was clearly evident for a post-hostilities organization capable of smoothly taking over a diminishing tactical situation from the military, further reducing it, and handling it on to the uniformed police. Such an organization would need both a tactical capability (minor) and a police capability, including powers of arrest and search.

The identification of this need resulted in the creation of the Police Field Force (PFF), a grouping of minor tactical components, strong enough to dominate a village/hamlet complex against the village guerrilla groups, within range to support the local representatives of the uniformed police, and in the direct police line of command to ensure the rapidity of response that only personal responsibility can inspire

The PFF is a lightly-armed, ground-mobile force administratively organized by companies, performing its function of maintaining a presence of government strength by platoons, each platoon responsible for the hamlets of one village area selected by the District Chief in coordination with the District Police Chief, filling the village/hamlet gap and complementary to the District Chief's RF/PF forces and his rural construction team

Deployment


The diagram on page 31 represents a "slice" of a pacification program which, for convenience, may be assumed to be one province

Illustrated is a typical situation in which the peripheral area is VC controlled and access by GVN can be effected only by a military operation, which would be conducted by ARVN. Such an operation might be short, with an aim of disturbing the VC to prevent their buildup - tactical, logistic or political. This type of operation would be described as interdiction.

The next inner ring is the designated area for ARVN pacification operations, aimed at eliminating VC main force and regional force units, and so depriving the VC infra-structure of the support they need to develop their activities. This type of operation would be described as destruction.

Finally, there is the pacified area, where control is exercised by the National Police in the normal civil sense. This is a development situation.

DEPLOYMENT PATTERNS - I



(Rear Zone of ARVN
PFF Operates in (Front Zone of National Police

The limits of these areas cannot be clearly defined. The rear of the ARVN area will be sufficiently clear of major VC concentrations for PFF to begin their operations, and the forward edge of the pacified area will still contain sections which are less than completely secure. It is this zone, broadly astride the boundary between military tactical action and civil police action, that is the PFF area of operation, and the rate at which PFF can move forward governs the rate of the whole pacification program. There can be no short cut.

As PFF move forward they are followed up by regular National Police and by the civil program of regional development.

The diagram on page 33 shows a typical PFF province allocation.

It will be observed that this province consists of five districts, of which

- One is thoroughly pacified and under normal NP security.

- One is VC controlled.

- Three have recently been cleared, or partly cleared, and are designated PFF "task districts", with one company each.

Looking more closely at one district, which has seven villages, we see

- One is secure, with normal NP arrangements.


- Two are VC controlled.

- Four have recently been cleared and are designated as "task villages", with one platoon each.

It will be noted that no provision is made for PFF deployment in the vicinity of the provincial capital. Their work is in the field.

It will be further noted that a PFF reserve platoon is located at district headquarters and that it is NOT a tactical reserve but an administrative reserve to ensure that the field platoons are at full operational strength.

DEPLOYMENT PATTERNS - II



PROVINCE PFF COMPONENT 3 companies each of 3 - 5 platoons

Districts

- 33 -

Villages

Finally, although operational directives come from the District Chief, through the District Chief of Police, to the Company Commander, the line of administrative control is through the PFF representatives on the staff of the Provincial Chief of Police and Regional Chief of Police

Pacification Role

The PFF is a part of the provincial pacification team and functions under the overall direction of the Province Chief, through the Province Chief of Police and the unit commander, to give expression to the Province Chief's pacification plan

The first stage in the pacification program is intelligence procurement, planning, and preparatory psychological warfare. The PFF must be actively associated with the plan from this first stage

The next stage is the tactical action of ARVN, with VNAF support, to clear the selected area of VC main force and provincial force units

This is followed by the securing of the cleared area by RF/PF elements. During this phase, the PFF is deployed to the villages selected for its operations

With security augmented by the RF/PF presence, the PFF

- Conducts day and night tactical patrols, normally in platoon strength,
- Initiates and maintains civic action procedures, either alone or in conjunction with the appropriate civilian organization,
- Supports the National Police in their resources control measures

When the situation is secured to a degree that the PFF can operate alone, the RF/PF move off to support further ARVN operations - but not before. It is fatal to redeploy the RF/PF on a rigid time table. Their onward movement can only be decided in the context of the local development of the security operation. That this may delay further planned deployments of ARVN is appreciated, but must be accepted

Command Structure

Command of the PFF is exercised by the Commander, PFF, who has the status of a Director at the Headquarters of the National Police. For this purpose, the Commander, PFF, has the Headquarters, PFF, at which are represented all branches of staff and services.

While every member of the PFF is a fully-trained policeman who, at the direction of the Director General, may at any time revert to a civil police function, he is also a fully trained soldier, operating within a field tactical context. Because the operations of the PFF are tactical, its administration, logistic support and discipline are designed to support tactical operations and, although within the overall police administrative framework, are distinct.

The Commander, PFF, is represented at the headquarters of Regions and Provinces by PFF officers attached to the offices of the Regional Chief of Police and Provincial Chief of Police respectively. The duty of these officers is to ensure continuous and adequate logistic and administrative support from Headquarters, PFF, to keep the Commander, PFF, continuously informed on all aspects of the status of his companies, and to ensure a proper working relationship between PFF company commanders and the Province District administration. In particular, they must ensure that the PFF field elements are used only for the purpose for which they have been provided, i.e., mobile field operations at village level. They will not provide personal security for Province or District Chiefs, their equipment will not be diverted to non-PFF elements nor may they be used as scouts for ARVN or RF/PF tactical operations.

As the PFF operates on a separate disciplinary code, designed to meet tactical conditions, the system of inquiry and punishment will reside within the PFF, cases beyond the competency of the company commander being referred to the representative of the Commander, PFF, at Province or Region as necessary.

It is the prerogative of the Province Chief to decide in which districts of his province the PFF companies will be deployed. This he will do as part of his pacification plan. From time to time, as the situation develops, one way or another, he may decide that

- 1) The local security has so deteriorated that the PFF can no longer operate according to concept, and will be withdrawn, or
- 2) The local security has *so* improved that PFF operations are no longer necessary, and security will pass to the regular police

It is the task of the Provincial Chief of Police to ensure that, within the selected "task districts", the police administrative and intelligence machinery and the arrangements for cooperation with all other government agencies (particularly the armed forces) are such that the PFF companies can effectively operate

It is the task of the PFF representative at Provincial Headquarters to ensure that the PFF companies allotted to a district are at all times and in all respects operationally effective

The District Chief will decide in which villages of his district the PFF platoons will be deployed. Thereafter, as the situation develops, he may re-deploy them (bearing in mind that, once re-deployed, they will not regain maximum operational effectiveness for three months)

The District Chief of Police will use all the District police resources to express his policy. Of these, the PFF company is only one, though probably the largest. He will give tasks (by designating areas) to the PFF Company Commander, who will deploy his platoons to villages to handle these tasks. He will not tell the PFF Company Commander how to do his job.

The PFF Platoon Commander will work in close association with the Village Chief of the village to which his platoon is assigned. However, the Village Chief has no authority over the Platoon and the Platoon

Commander has no authority over the Village Chief. The essence of the PFF is collaboration with the village and hamlet authorities.

Training Centers

A Police Field Force Unit Training Center has been constructed at Trai Mat in the mountains near Dalat, Tuyen Duc Province. As of 1 March 1966, five companies had graduated from this center and six companies were undergoing training, which consists of twelve weeks of intensive field work. Following a decision of the Director General, National Police, to give basic police training for all recruit policemen destined for the Field Force at Dalat, construction of a basic training center adjacent to the unit training center was begun. This new center will have a capacity of 1000 trainees.

Though not fully equipped, the operations of the limited number of companies deployed by 1 March 1966 have tended to confirm the soundness of the Police Field Force concept.

Strength

As of March 1, 1966 the Field Force was authorized a strength of 8500 men, to be organized into 47 companies. It seemed probable that this authorization would be increased eventually.

USAID Support

The USAID is providing technical assistance and extensive budgetary and commodity support to the Field Force, in the belief that it can and will make a major contribution toward pacification of the country. A total of fifteen Public Safety Advisors is planned, although only eight were on board in March 1966. A special Assistant for Counterinsurgency, located in the USAID Office of Public Safety, coordinates Field Force plans and operations with related activities. The USAID has provided the arms and ammunition and most of the equipment of the Field Forces, including some rations and clothing.



Police Field Force trainees at Dalat camp on the pistol range and hand grenade throwing range



Support of the Resources Control Program

The Resources Control Program is based on the premise that the Viet Cong, like any other sizable guerrilla force, is dependent on the support of the local populace for its continued existence (Confer Mao Tse Tung's analogy of the guerrilla as a fish who swims in the ocean of the population) If popular support is not forthcoming, then the guerrilla force cannot maintain itself in the field, much less move effectively on the offensive This premise is considered valid in spite of the fact that the Viet Cong are receiving reinforcements and logistic support from outside the boundaries of South Vietnam It is essential therefore to break contact between the Viet Cong and the general population, to the maximum extent possible, thus depriving the Viet Cong of supplies, intelligence and other support (The principles of resources control, as well as an account of the Malayan experience, are set forth in a 200-page pamphlet The Police and Resources Control in Counter-Insurgency by E H Adkins, Jr , published by the USAID/Vietnam in 1965)

The first U S - supported efforts in this direction date back to 1961 and 1962, when a Public Safety Advisor visited Malaya and studied the successful Resources Control Program employed there Subsequently 42 instructors were trained in the techniques of resources control and these in turn trained some 300 policemen However, the effort was allowed to lapse, owing to opposition within the GVN at the time

This opposition was finally overcome and in September 1964 an operation christened Hop Tac (Cooperation) was mounted in Saigon and seven surrounding provinces (Bien Hoa, Gia Dinh, Binh Duong, Hau Nghia, Long An, Phuoc Tuy, Phuoc Thanh) This area, with 3,600,000 people and eighty percent of Vietnam's industrial capacity, was the principal source of non-agricultural supplies for the Viet Cong The theory was that the Army (ARVN) would clear the area progressively of armed opposition and that the National Police would immediately move into the pacified areas, hold them, and establish resources control there, as well as in the already secure areas

To this end, police strength in the area was increased by 3445 over a two-month period (from 9447). Additional vehicles were assigned and a few assault craft were borrowed from the Army. The original 42 instructors were given refresher training and 58 new instructors were trained.

The GVN assigned responsibility for resources control to the National Police and a bureau was established for this purpose within National Headquarters. This bureau also assumed staff responsibility for the Family Census and Identity Card program (vide infra).

The Hop Tac program did not attain maximum results as rapidly as had been hoped, primarily because the ARVN was not able to clear areas on schedule. On the other hand, it is considered that the Resources Control Program in the pacified areas has fully met expectations. Intelligence reports indicate that the Viet Cong have been hurt.

Plans have been completed for extending the program to the Mekong Delta. (It should be noted that the system of checkpoints is in use throughout the country now, what is involved next is an intensification of the effort, utilizing more trained men and greater material resources.) The Delta contains most of the 6,000,000 acres under rice cultivation in South Vietnam and produces enough rice to feed the whole country and provide a surplus which normally constitutes Vietnam's principal export. The terrain of the country, crisscrossed by rivers and streams interlocked by irrigation ditches and rich in food provides an ideal site for guerrilla activities. Success in resources control here presents numerous and great difficulties, if attained, it will render the Viet Cong position in the whole Delta precarious.

The problem of restricting, depriving and denying personnel, logistical and communications support to the enemy guerrillas is attacked by interrupting the movement of men and materiel in three ways:

- a. The establishment of static (fixed) checkpoints along primary and secondary arteries of travel, both land and marine.

b Implementation of mobile or surprise checkpoints to catch individuals trying to by-pass a static control point in a vehicle, and utilization of patrols to cover the foot paths and trails by which tons of material may be transported on the shoulders of volunteer or indentured coolies

c Establishment of sound rural internal security along with appropriate controls in villages and strategic hamlets to obstruct the tremendous seepage of supplies and information from these population centers to the enemy

One of the first things to be done in controlling human resources is to identify the people. The first Vietnamese national program for identification of the population was introduced in 1938. The identification document was a simple piece of paper on which the required identification data were printed. This was found to be an unsuitable document, but did serve the useful purpose of making an initial identification of the country's people.

In 1957 legislation was passed requiring all persons over the age of 18 to obtain and carry an identification card. Everyone was to be fingerprinted when a card was issued to him, with two fingerprint impressions becoming part of the ID card and a full set of prints being sent to the files of the Central Identification Bureau of the National Police Headquarters in Saigon. Lack of durability of these cards, made by a simple laminating process, together with forgeries by the Viet Cong, led to the development of the ID card now used. Cards are now made with safety paper, covered with laminated plastic, which is embossed on one side, a distinctive kind of plastic is used and the plastic is budded to the paper card inside the plastic.

In the cities, people were asked by the Government to come to processing stations to complete the paper work necessary to implement the ID Card Program. In the rural areas the Government went to the people, in the form of mobile processing teams, which could service one village or small area at a time.

The program was sponsored by the then Public Safety Division. USAID furnished all the cameras, lights and related equipment necessary to prepare the cards. Each person to whom a card was issued was charged 10 piasters, just enough to cover the cost of photographic paper, chemicals, blank forms and salaries of the people who did the processing.

The Viet Cong reacted violently to this ID Card Program and did their best to nullify it. They ambushed mobile registry teams, threw grenades at registration centers, and conducted an anti-registration propaganda campaign. Armed police frustrated these efforts, however.

The ID Card Program was declared completed on June 30, 1963, by which time cards had been issued to approximately 7,000,000 of the approximately 8,000,000 population over 18 years of age. The remaining 1,000,000 people could not be reached since they were under control of the Viet Cong. At the present time about 25,000 persons reaching the age of 18 are processed each month.

ID cards, of course, become out of date. People change in appearance, in name (through marriage) and otherwise and the cards themselves deteriorate. It therefore becomes necessary to reissue the cards on some systematic basis. This problem is currently under study and it is hoped to begin a program of reissuance sometime in 1966. One possibility is to reissue all cards when a certain specified period, such as five years, has elapsed since the date of original issue. Another possibility is to reissue all cards in certain geographical areas, such as a city or province. In any case the reissuance presents many administrative problems which have not yet been solved. Furthermore, the cards themselves are of little value for police purposes, and may even hamper the police, if they are not based in the first instance on proper identification of the subject. This problem is closely related to the problem of unclassified and unfiled fingerprint cards (see page 48). Until these twin problems can be solved, Vietnam cannot be said to have an adequate system of personal identification.

The Family Census consists of an inventory of the population by housing unit. The registration form is a booklet in which are recorded pertinent data concerning each legal resident of a particular dwelling unit. These data include the name and curriculum vitae of each resident, all significant resources of the residents, such as outbuildings, tools and domestic animals, and the political affiliations or tendencies of each resident, if known. A group photograph (highly prized by most families) is also included. Two copies of each booklet are made, of which one is held by the family and one by the authorities. Each head of household is responsible for reporting changes, such as births and deaths and changes of address.

These documents obviously contain information of value for many purposes, including population census and vital statistics, although it is doubtful if they are fully exploited. From the standpoint of the police, especially in resources control, they are invaluable. Armed with the appropriate booklets, the Police can cordon off an area and check every dwelling place within. Using this technique, particularly during the curfew hours, they detect and apprehend illegal residents, draft dodgers, deserters, and wanted criminals or suspects. Not infrequently VC infiltrators or suspects are discovered in this manner. Follow-up investigations then reveal further information and may lift a corner of the veil over the VC infrastructure. There is no doubt that such police checks, conducted regularly, tend to keep the VC off balance, interrupt VC intelligence and psychological warfare operations and interfere with supply, sabotage and terrorist activities. The Police, especially in Saigon, are pursuing this program vigorously.


For a statistical summary of some of the results obtained to date, see the tables on pages 44 -47.

USAID has cooperated fully with the National Police in the establishment of a sound Resources Control Program. It has provided high-level technical assistance and also significant amounts of equipment and

NATIONWIDE RESULTS OF THE RESOURCES CONTROL PROGRAM

From 1 January to 30 December 1965

WEAPONS




Total 677 units

NATIONWIDE RESULTS OF THE RESOURCES CONTROL PROGRAM

From 1 January to 10 December 1965

FOODSTUFFS




Total 2, 852, 680 units

NATIONWIDE RESULTS OF THE RESOURCES CONTROL PROGRAM

From 1 January to 30 December 1965

MEDICINES




Total 96,839 units

NATIONWIDE RESULTS OF THE RESOURCES CONTROL PROGRAM

From 1 January to 30 December 1965

EQUIPMENT



Total 1,041,438 units

supplies In 1966 it is planned to initiate procurement of some 76 forty-foot river patrol craft for use in the Delta and also to provide limited budgetary support

Records and Identification

As indicated above, good records are fundamental to all police work. However, the records of the National Police, invaluable though they are, leave much to be desired. The system of personal and incident dossiers is outmoded, as it overuses scarce filing space, intermingles police records with records of other agencies and is not conducive to the excerpting of crime statistics for administrative use. Records are not retired and/or destroyed when they have outlived their usefulness and duplicate records are maintained, with consequent additional strain on limited personnel and storage facilities. There are some 7,500,000 unclassified civilian fingerprint cards, some of which are filed alphabetically, but many of which are simply stored in bags and are thus completely unusable.

The National Police, with the assistance of USAID, are working hard to remedy these deficiencies. Standard procedures are being developed for the checking and filing of fingerprints of arrested persons. Training in fingerprint classification is being extended, and files are being decentralized to provincial and regional levels. A standard system of police records is being developed which should make the records less bulky and more usable than in the existing non-system. Hopefully a large volume of obsolete records will be retired and destroyed, either with or without being microfilmed. (Only a small portion need to be preserved for posterity.)


USAID is in process of furnishing additional filing cabinets, which are urgently required, and limited quantities of other equipment and supplies. It is also furnishing technical advice and guidance, which, as is not infrequent, is more important than equipment.

VIỆT-NAM CỘNG HÒA
BỘ NỘI-VỤ




THẺ CĂN-CƯỚC

Số 055323

Họ Tên DƯƠNG-VAN-SÁU
 Ngày, năm sanh 1931
 Nơi sanh Vĩnh-phước-Tây
Cholon
 Cha Côn
 Mẹ Lê thị-Lân
 Nghề nghiệp Làm Công
 Địa-chỉ 202, Thoại-Ngọc-Hầu, Angiang



Identity cards which all Vietnamese 18 years of age, and over, must carry on their persons at all times

Cao 1 th 69	Dầu vết riêng N.
Nặng 57 Kg	Chăm sọ trước 8. đầu mày phải .
	Long-Xuyên ngày 30-3- 1962
	QUẬN- TRƯỞNG, 

USAID is also providing technical assistance and commodity support for the police laboratory, which is organizationally associated with the Records Bureau

Support of Saigon Municipal Police

The Saigon Municipal Police are an integral part of the National Police, but by virtue of their numerical strength and their strategic location in the capital city, they exercise a greater degree of autonomy than the forces of the provinces or the other autonomous cities

The Saigon Police suffer from much the same weaknesses as the rest of the National Police, to wit, poor administration and management, arising out of lack of trained and experienced administrators, inadequately trained personnel, a basically inadequate personnel system, an inadequate budget further complicated by unduly rigid rules for budget administration, and shortages of equipment and material of all kinds, ranging from patrol vehicles and office equipment to gasoline for cars and motorcycles. For example, the daily allowance of gasoline per vehicle is ten litres - enough to run a jeep about thirty miles in Saigon - as compared with a daily minimum of 100 miles per vehicle in an American municipal jurisdiction. Precinct administration is weak and needs greater attention

In recent years the Saigon Police have been subjected to numerous changes in the upper echelons, associated with changes at the National Police Headquarters, with consequent disruptive effects. Further political changes would no doubt be reflected in the Municipal Police also

Nevertheless some progress has been made and more is in prospect

The Saigon Police have played an important and increasingly effective role in the Resources Control Program. Checkpoint operations and the associated training have shown good results in terms of Viet Cong arrested and contraband seized. The Family Census Program

within Saigon is proving effective in the detection of illegal residents and thus has made it more difficult for VC cadres to infiltrate and live within the city. Continuing sweeps have netted numerous draft dodgers, military deserters and wanted criminals, as well as illegal residents and known or suspected VC. While these programs were at first resisted by some Saigon Police administrators, the input of men and materiel has gradually paid off and the programs are now generally supported.

A system of "Roll Call" training has been instituted consisting of twenty-minute lectures on police procedures and practical police problems which are given to personnel of each shift immediately before they go on duty. This device, which was originated in the United States, where it is now widely used, has also proved to be a valuable element in the Saigon Police training program - so much so, in fact, that it has been adopted by the National Police Headquarters and is being instituted in the various provinces.

USAID proposes to take the following actions in 1966 in support of the Saigon Police:

--- To develop and maintain close counterpart relationships between precinct commanders and their Public Safety Advisors, thereby assisting the precinct commanders to make rapid and sound decisions and judgments in everyday precinct management and operations. A USAID Public Safety Advisor has been assigned to each precinct.

--- To coordinate plans with American military elements for the elimination or reduction of static police guard posts at American military facilities, thereby freeing a minimum estimated 25 percent of the total force for the performance of regular police duties.

--- To establish a system of mobile radio patrols in support of the fixed post system now generally employed, thus providing improved police protection and effecting substantial savings in manpower. The Mission has already furnished enough radio-equipped vehicles to permit the assignment of approximately 40 continuous patrols.

--- To-obtain National Police Directorate General sanction of a trial work schedule calling for a basic work day of eight hours and providing for 16 hours off duty for each policeman between regular tours of duty This contrasts with the present system of four hours on and eight hours off throughout the seven-day work week

--- To develop and establish, in a pilot precinct, a coordinated system of operational record-keeping forms and procedures for their use

--- To obtain Saigon Municipal Police Directorate and National Police Directorate General support of traffic law enforcement Advisory assistance to the traffic unit is being provided, as well as minimum traffic control equipment, such as traffic lights

--- To provide advisory assistance to the Harbor Police in harbor police management and operations

--- To provide commodities (boats, spare parts, tools and supplies) as necessary for Harbor Police operations, upon conclusion of an agreement between the Mission and marine security agencies (Harbor Police, Resources Control Bureau, and Customs Service) providing for combined support and maintenance facilities at Saigon and elsewhere as appropriate

--- To obtain a consolidated airport security organization (perhaps under the VN Air Force or the National Police) in place of the several autonomous and, to some extent, duplicating commands which now exist, and to strengthen the Saigon Police role at the airport, as it may be defined, through advisory services, participant training and minimum commodity support

--- To assist the Saigon Municipal Police Directorate in the establishment of improved management and administrative procedures within the Directorate Special emphasis will be given to personnel administration establishment of a pilot precinct, and improved budget preparation and follow-up

The National Police Training Program

The typical police recruit is a young man with a sixth-grade education who may or may not have had military training He knows

virtually nothing about law or law enforcement, has never driven an automobile or a truck, is ignorant of mechanics, and, unless he has served in the army, has never fired a weapon. However, he is literate, and this in itself is of great advantage. In practice, he has proven to be reasonably intelligent and adaptable and compares well with police recruits in other developing countries. His first and basic need is training.

At the beginning of 1966, the basic (recruit) training course was six weeks, of which one was devoted to resources control. This was obviously inadequate and was so acknowledged by the responsible authorities, but the urgent need to get policemen on the job, combined with a dearth of training facilities, made a longer course impracticable. In January 1966, however, the basic course was lengthened to twelve weeks, a major step in the right direction. The curriculum of the twelve week course is shown on page 56.

The National Police now plan to have three basic training schools, at Vung Tau (Rach Dua), Da Nang and Dalat. Rach Dua will be expanded to a capacity of 2,000 recruits at any one time, as compared with its present 1,000 and Da Nang and Dalat developed to a capacity of 1,000 each. The output of the Dalat basic training center is destined for the Police Field Force Training school sites presently in use at Tam Hiep and Le Van Duyet (in the Saigon area) will be released to the Army as soon as alternate facilities are ready for occupancy.

An advanced training school is under construction at Thu Duc, near Saigon, and there are plans for the eventual creation of a police college at Dalat, either along the lines of the Royal Malaysian Police College near Kuala Lumpur or of the Thai Police College near Bangkok. These plans will probably have to wait until the present budgetary stringency is eased, but their realization is an essential part of the training program.


Refresher training and retraining are also essential to a complete training program, and this is doubly true in Vietnam where the initial basic training was inadequate prior to 1966. There are plans, not yet




Training Advisor Brooks D. Anderson illustrating hand-to-hand combat tactics to N P instructor and trainees
Anderson died on duty in Saigon in May 1966



Training Advisor Thomas P. Isbell illustrating use of the "sawed off" 12 gauge shotgun to N P firearms instructor



Equipment furnished under the Public Safety program in use at repair shop of Combined Telecommunications Directorate



Training Advisor Dudley J Britton demonstrating use of 38 caliber revolver to N P Training Instructors

CURRICULUM NATIONAL POLICE
BASIC TRAINING PROGRAM
528 hours 12 weeks

S U B J E C T S	H O U R S
<hr style="border-top: 1px dashed black;"/>	
A- <u>GENERAL POLICE SERVICE</u>	
1- General Administration	12
2- Police Administration	40
3- Judicial Police	24
4- Resources Control	40
5- I D Cards, Records, Scientific Police	10
6- Civil Disturbance Control	24
7- Traffic Police	12
B- <u>SPECIAL BRANCH POLICE</u>	24
C- <u>MISCELLANEOUS</u>	
1- Note-taking	2
2- Use of Telephone & Mobile Radio	4
3- Fire Prevention & Protection	4
4- First Aid	10
5- Defensive Tactics & Disarming Techniques, Police Baton	20
6- Circumstances of Using Weapons	4
7- Evacuation, Alarms & Curfews	4
D- <u>PSYWAR & PUBLIC RELATIONS</u>	16
1- Police Attitude	10
E- <u>DIRECTOR'S TIME, SANITATION</u>	20
F- <u>MILITARY TRAINING</u>	
1- Military Basic	132
2- Weapons, Firearms	116
	<hr/>
Total	528
G- <u>EXAMINATIONS</u> (3 days)	24

worked out in complete detail, for retraining for all police personnel now serving Weapons refresher training is currently being given to as many police as can be accommodated at the rather limited firing ranges available to the police in the Regions and Provinces


USAID has encouraged the development of an adequate training program and has supported it with men, money and materiel, that is, with technical advice, budgetary support, and equipment and supplies Among the last named, training aids, books, film, and other essential commodities have been and will continue to be furnished Thirteen USAID Training Advisors are planned

Civil Disturbance Control

Good police administration requires that in times of emergency there be a capability for dealing with unruly demonstrations, riots, and natural disasters Enlightened practice also requires that timely measures be taken to prevent the development of civil disturbances and, when they do occur, that they be dealt with in accordance with the "principle of minimum force" For this reason it is essential that a properly trained and equipped civil police organization be available and that military units be employed for this purpose only as a last resort

During the Diem regime, civil disturbance control was the work of the Combat Police, who were deployed throughout Viet Nam in all the major towns, the number in any one town varying according to the size of the town and the security hazards of the surrounding area Shortly after the assassination of Diem, the Combat Police, whose excesses had caused them to be popularly detested, were disbanded

However, the requirement for specially trained police continued to exist, especially in Saigon, and in December 1964, following extensive disorders, a special unit was created and training was initiated In January 1965, it was decided to create two battalions, to be known as Order Police These two battalions, the 222 and the 816 how have approximately 1000 men each Both are located in Saigon, the 222



Traffic Advisor Frederick R Hunt helping in planning the establishment of a series of one-way streets for Saigon traffic



British Advisors assigned to Saigon Public Safety Office, Thomas S Thomas, William Ford and Leslie T Pridgeon

directly under the Director General of National Police and the 816 under the Director, Saigon Municipal Police. The 222 Battalion is currently used to bolster night security in the outlying precincts, while the 816 is primarily a reserve force. Both are in readiness when called upon to perform their primary function. Creation of a third battalion sometime in the future is under consideration.

During FY 1966 it is planned to institute a rotational system of training within the Saigon Municipal Police so that as a long term project all the police within the capital city will be trained in civil disturbance control. This training will produce an adequate number of specially selected men, who after a course in the techniques of instruction, will provide a cadre of instructors. These instructors will be used for civil disturbance control training in the various Regional Directorates throughout Vietnam.

During FY 1967 it is proposed to initiate training in civil disturbance control in each of the six Regional Directorates. The training course will last for four months and will be repeated three times yearly at each of the six Regional training centers, namely Can Tho, My Tho, Bien Hoa, Ban Me Thuot, Nha Trang and Hue.

As a long-term project, trained men from the Regional Directorates will be used as instructors for civil disturbance control training at the provincial and district levels.

Each District Police Chief within the Regional Directorate will be required to nominate a minimum number of men from within his command to attend the training course. This will ensure that the company will always have some men familiar with the topography of any of the Directorate in which they may be required to operate.

Men who during training prove to be of outstanding ability and display qualities of leadership will be recommended for consideration for a course at the Command School. A promotion incentive will thus be created.

Technical advice in civil disturbance control is currently provided by a British Police Advisor attached to the **USAID** Office of Public Safety. The USAID has provided substantial commodity support including vehicles, weapons and ammunition, and plans to continue support of this essential activity, as well as to promote the doctrines of prevention and minimum force.

Support of Other National Police Activities


Harbor Police

The Harbor Police, which is a section of the Saigon Municipal Police (q v) patrols the waters of the Saigon River from below the mouth of the Kinh Te Canal to the GVN Navy piers up river from the commercial docks. A river patrol operates 24 hours a day every day to protect ships entering and leaving the harbor against the operations of pirates and to discourage smugglers. The land patrol is responsible for the security of the harbor from the land side. They are responsible for safety of ship's cargo until it is placed in warehouses. All vehicles and persons entering and leaving the harbor are checked by Harbor Police, who also notify masters of ships of local conditions and needed security precautions. Crimes committed aboard ships in the harbor are investigated by Harbor Police personnel, who also check departing ships for stowaways and issue passes for merchant seamen and ship's passengers.


The Public Safety Advisor working with the Harbor Police assists in all problems of administration and operation related to that organization. Vessels and other equipment have been provided by the USAID.

Airport Police


The Airport Police is also a section of the Saigon Municipal Police. It has the responsibility for examining passports, especially for proper visas, checking manifests, checking incoming and outgoing passengers prohibited from entering or leaving the country for political




Reginald S Davis - Senior Advisor, Telecommunications
(left) and P S Communications Advisor Robert A Craft
receiving GVN awards of merit for their work from the
Director General of National Police



Harbor Police Advisor Otto H Ludwig,
Jr with Police Patrol Craft



Telecommunications equipment furnished by U S A I D
as part of Public Safety program



Saigon Office of Public Safety teletype operators

or other reasons, investigating and issuing passes to persons having business in the airport (Tan Son Nhut) at Saigon, providing guard posts at entrances and strategic areas at the airport and surrounding areas, and conducting undercover investigations by plain clothes police personnel in the airport area

A Public Safety Advisor is assigned to participate in activities designed to improve security at the Tan Son Nhut Airport and suggest methods for improvement in efficiency and utilization of security personnel and equipment

Special Police Branch

The Chief, Special Police Branch, on 15 April 1964, issued the following "statement of mission" which is still valid "Special Police Branch is in charge of intelligence, responsible for collection of information necessary for the eradication of any threat to internal security which may hurt the Republic's national security " This branch maintains hourly and daily liaison with all other GVN intelligence agencies, both military and civilian, as well as with Saigon Municipal Police Headquarters The Special Branch has units working in all National Police regional and provincial headquarters, in most districts, and in many villages and hamlets throughout the country

The Public Safety Advisor working with this branch suggests the use of acceptable police techniques to be employed in pursuing the Branch mission, recommends improvements needed for performance of modern operations, and suggests interrogation techniques, particularly for Viet Cong suspects and political prisoners who threaten internal security He also conducts local and national level instruction and is currently employed in devising a pattern of integrated activity for the Special Branch and the Police Field Forces He is also concerned in the building, staffing, and administrative establishment of a nationwide network of provincial interrogation centers to be manned by the Special Branch

Internal Affairs Division

This division of the National Police Headquarters was created during March 1964 to investigate all complaints received against members of the police and to make recommendations concerning disciplinary action to the Director General. It is responsible directly to the Director General alone. All personnel of this division are stationed at the headquarters. The case load outside of Saigon is handled by road trips.

When evidence of a crime is obtained, reports are furnished to the Judicial Police for their disposition.

The Advisor assigned to work with this Division has the responsibility to confer with and advise the Chief and Assistant Chiefs of the Division on policies and procedures in the administration of the office. He also assists in the evaluation of complaints received, makes recommendations as to contemplated investigations, and assists in supervision of important cases. The Advisor also lectures in special training classes for personnel of the division.

Judicial Police Service

This branch of the National Police conducts open (non-covert) investigations as assigned by the various courts, deals with economic and financial offenses, investigates smuggling and black market offenses, conducts investigations of persons indebted to the government and members of former regimes, makes open investigations upon receipt of complaints, investigates narcotic cases and illegal purchases of medicinals, controls purchase of chemicals and items having military value, investigates and makes arrests of professional criminals, conducts investigations upon request of other police agencies and governmental bodies throughout the country on important cases, makes undercover investigations on undeveloped cases.

The advisor assigned to this Service examines procedures and techniques and suggests efficient and effective operational methods

Immigration Service

The Immigration Service, a branch of the Judicial Police, is responsible for control of foreigners entering into, residing in, and leaving Vietnam. Visas are issued by this service, after approval has been granted by the Minister. Foreigners who apply for Vietnamese citizenship are investigated by the Immigration Service. Passenger and commodity control at Saigon's Tan Son Nhut Airport is also vested in this service.

The Advisor working with the Immigration Service examines procedures and techniques of the Service with the purpose of making all operations more efficient and effective.

Administrative Police

The Administrative Police Service consists of the Administrative Investigation Bureau, the Passport Bureau, the Research and Control Bureau and the Secretariat of the Service. Their work consists of making background checks of civil servants, contractors, business men, teachers and cab drivers. They investigate certain types of sensitive employment, investigate and issue permits to carry weapons and operate radio stations, register and change registrations of vehicles, make investigations before issuance of passports to Vietnamese nationals and investigate and process all political and criminal prisoners to be released. One USAID Public Safety Advisor maintains liaison with the Service, but to date USAID support has been minimal.

Support of Combined Telecommunications Directorate

The Combined Telecommunications Directorate (CTD) is responsible for the establishment and operation of an integrated system of country-wide telecommunications - radio, telegraph, teletype, telephone - for all Government Agencies directly engaged in providing civil

security. These include, but are not limited to, the Directorate General of National Police, the Ministry of Interior, the Customs Service, the Rehabilitation Service, and the Railway Security Service. This arrangement was designed to eliminate duplication of manpower and equipment, and without doubt it is eminently successful in achieving this objective.

The system as planned, and now virtually completed, is shown pictorially on page 67. It will be noted that it follows established government channels in proceeding from the National Capital in Saigon to the Regions and thence on to Provinces, Districts, Villages and Hamlets. Communication is by radio teletype from Saigon to the Regions, by radio telegraph from Regions to Provinces and from Provinces to Districts, and by radio-phone from Districts to Villages. There is a land-line teletype system within Saigon inter-connecting the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of Interior, the Directorate General of National Police, the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) and USAID with the CTD communications center.

The system extending from Saigon through Regions and Provinces to Districts is known as the Administrative Network and is owned and operated by the CTD. It will handle messages for any government agency, but police traffic takes precedence over other traffic.

The CTD has a Base Communications Center at Saigon and a Base Depot and Technical Training Center near Thu Duc, in the Saigon area. There are six Regional Headquarters, corresponding to the National Police Regions, with radio relay facilities and technical and logistic capabilities to support communications activities in each Region. The CTD staff numbers approximately 2600.


Since the beginning of 1965 the USAID has gradually been providing radio-phone equipment to enable the Director General of National Police to communicate with the Regional Police Directors, the Regional Directors with the Provincial Police Chiefs and these in turn with District Police Chiefs. To date radios have been installed in Regional,



USOM/PSD COMBINED SECURITY TELECOMMUNICATION DIRECTORATE



NATIONAL
RADIO TELETYPE SYSTEM
6 REGIONS
RADIO TELEGRAPH SYSTEM
43 PROVINCES
RADIO TELEGRAPH SYSTEM
238 DISTRICTS
VILLAGE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
RADIO PHONE
2500 VILLAGES
7000 HAMLETS




Provincial and District Police offices This is basically a VHF-FM radio system In the Highlands and South Lowland Regions an HF-SSB radio-phone system has been installed between Regional Headquarters and Provinces because the distances are too great for VHF-FM service Early in 1966 the first FM-1 and FM-5 radios were received and will be issued to Provincial and District Police, including police and Resources Control checkpoints Eventually there will be about 5000 of these radios in all phases of the Police organization, including Field Forces (See page 69 for illustrations of these radios)


A major effort of CTD, supported by USAID, has been the development, establishment and support of the Village-Hamlet Radio System This is a system of about 12,000 two-way radio-phone units that were designed and procured to USAID specifications for specific requirements in Vietnam The first village radios were installed early in 1962 and final installation was made in June 1965 It has been proposed to procure additional radios in FY-67 to replace those lost to VC action and to provide equipment for newly activated or recaptured areas and for pacification teams

The USAID, through its Office of Public Safety, has provided technical assistance and equipment in support of the CTD In addition to five American public safety communications technicians on the USAID staff, there are approximately 25 American technicians provided under a contract (currently the Philco Corporation) and 50 Filipino technicians employed under another contract (currently Landis Brothers) Virtually all of the telecommunications equipment of the CTD and the other civil security agencies, with a value of many million dollars, has been supplied by USAID Expansion, upgrading and support of these systems is continuing

The USAID has also provided direct communications support to the Saigon Municipal Police Department Since 1958 this Department's telecommunications capability has been expanded to provide a central



FM 1 (above) and FM 5 radios furnished through USAID
Combined Telecommunications Directorate



communications center, a dispatching radio station, about 120 radio-equipped mobile patrol vehicles, 50 fixed-radiophone-equipped security posts, a call-box telephone system of 40 call-boxes and more than 150 hand-held radios for patrol use

The Customs Service has been provided with ship-to-shore radios and equipment for border posts. Radios have also been furnished the Rehabilitation (prison) Service, the Railway Security Service, and the Port Authority for pilot operations at Saigon and Danang. CTD provides the engineering, technical and logistic facilities to support these organic telecommunications systems.

The CTD has also provided service to USAID by handling 10,000 USAID messages to and between the USAID Offices in Saigon, the four Regions and the 43 Provinces in 1965. In addition to the message traffic, CTD personnel assist the USAID field operations by providing telephone facilities and ground-air radios and teletype service from the CTD Regions to USAID Regional Offices.

The USAID program for the immediate future includes the following:

- 1 Completion and continued support of the command and intelligence radiophone system for the National Police and the issue of radios to Police Field Forces and rural posts and patrols
- 2 Continued support of the Saigon Police, Customs Service, Rehabilitation Service and other civil security agencies
- 3 Provision of technical and commodity support to CTD to enable that Directorate to furnish support to its "users"

Support of the Customs Service

Customs receipts constitute approximately forty per cent of the regular GVN budget revenues. In the opinion of the Finance Minister, with which the senior USAID Customs Advisor concurs, up-grading of



Telecommunication equipment furnished under
U S A I D Public Safety program



the quality of the inspectional services would result in a significant increase in collections. The USAID Customs Advisors have devoted as much time as feasible to assisting GVN customs personnel with the clearing of ships and cargoes in the port area, but much remains to be done in management and control, documentation, appraisal and financial procedures. It is possible that a Participating Agency Service Agreement (PASA) with the U S Customs Bureau may offer the best long-range solution.

Customs enforcement and investigations are the responsibility of the Customs Fraud Repression Service. Owing in large part to lack of confidence in the personnel formerly assigned to this unit, it has received very little support from the USAID. However, it is now considered that some limited support may be worthwhile and it is proposed to furnish certain equipment and supplies which will extend its capability in the investigation of criminal offenses against the customs laws.

Other than for two participants who were accepted for third country training some three years ago, USAID has not supported any Customs training. Local training in weapons, particularly for the boat fleet personnel and for those assigned to Cambodian Border outposts, was initiated in 1965. There has been no formal training within the Customs Service itself since the Vietnamese took over from the French. A program has been drawn up whereby the younger officers who have entered the service in the past five years may receive basic training.

Any significant program of up-grading customs procedures necessitates a corresponding build-up of their fiscal facilities. The buildings and collection offices in the major ports of Saigon and Danang have long outlived their usefulness and replacement is badly needed. There is a need for dock and pier facilities, storage warehouses, etc., for the port areas and also for the customs stations along the Mekong and Bassac rivers. Under the present procedure this necessitates piaster expenditures which cannot be expected with any degree of optimism from

the present meager resources of the Vietnamese government. Although approximately 25 million piasters have been requested in the budget for construction of required facilities, none have been forthcoming.

The weapons with which the Customs Service was equipped were the leftovers of the French colonial regime. When several customs outposts were overrun by the Viet Cong in succession in early 1964, owing primarily to inadequacies in their protective facilities, it was clear that improvements were in order. During FY 1965 some 500 weapons, ranging from 38 calibre revolvers to 60mm mortars, were furnished by USAID and were distributed to various outposts and boat fleet units. An equivalent number of obsolete and antiquated weapons of various types were collected and turned over for destruction by the Army.

Adequate stores of ammunition for both training and operations have been procured by USAID and delivered to the Customs Service. This is a continuing requirement.


A start has been made in up-grading the vehicle fleet of the Customs Service by supplying 12 jeeps and two five-ton trucks and ordering five more vehicles for FY 1966. The Customs rolling stock is in poor condition countrywide owing to the lack of proper maintenance facilities, particularly in the areas outside of Saigon. In Saigon itself the situation is not bad and will continue to improve, particularly since the USAID has equipped a very good maintenance and repair shop with the tools and equipment necessary to perform satisfactory maintenance. No up-grading of the rolling stock is contemplated for the country areas, nor does it appear feasible, since the officers in those areas are extremely hesitant about accepting jeeps because of the security situation. They feel they can travel safely in their respective areas only when are not identified as government officers. In order to achieve this status they travel in civilian clothes without identification and in European made vehicles such as Peugeot and Citroen.

No additional units have been acquired for the boat fleet since the Customs Service became a separate entity. However, in order to enable the Service to carry out its responsibilities, it was apparent that a build-up of the boat fleet would be necessary. Accordingly, additional craft were ordered in FY 1965 and FY 1966 (a total of 50), mostly 30 and 40-foot U S Coast Guard utility craft. These will be put in service in the Mekong-Bassac river complex and in the deep seaports of the South China Sea.


The facility for vehicle repairs, in Saigon has been up-graded to a quite satisfactory state. This maintenance unit is also engaged in maintenance and repair of the various boat fleet units. Additional equipment has been secured and more has been ordered sufficient to bring this up to a high level of operating capability. For the future there are under way steps to set up an additional maintenance facility at Vinh Long in the Delta area to take care of the requirements of the Customs boat fleet units operating on the rivers and also simultaneously to service the National Police water-borne units which will be used in resources control.

The Customs Service operates a laboratory for analysis of the components of imported commodities so that proper classification and evaluation of these commodities may be made. The laboratory is used for the secondary purpose of such criminal identification work as the Customs activities necessitate. The laboratory, while effective, is possessed of a considerable amount of obsolete equipment. A survey of its needs **was** conducted by a Public Safety Laboratory Technician and an order has been placed for approximately \$5,000 worth of new equipment which will significantly up-grade its capability and make it much more useful for routine customs and police ballistics and identification work.

During the past two years, as part of the Public Safety program, a countrywide radio net has been established tying in all customs posts.



Translator and typing pools of **Saigon** Office of Public Safety



and maritime units with the headquarters station in Saigon. The net is operating satisfactorily.

For the future, it is planned to increase the patrol fleet from 29 to 70 vessels, while scrapping 27 obsolete vessels, to expand the training program, and to reorganize the service in such manner as to strengthen internal management and control.

Technical assistance to the Customs Service has been provided by three Public Safety Advisors. In 1966 a decision was reached to provide additional technical assistance of an operational nature through the USAID Assistant Director for Special Projects, who now has the operational responsibility for technical assistance to the Customs Service. OPS will continue to manage the necessary supporting commodity acquisitions.

Support of Prison Rehabilitation

Following the overthrow of the Diem regime, the number of prisoners was reduced from about 30,000 to about 16,000, but is now back to 25,000, owing to more GVN and U.S. military activity. Several new and more modern prisons are under construction to replace some of the more primitive institutions in use at present. Prisoners are being segregated by types of crimes and severity. Approximately \$200,000 worth of U.S. commodities have been received, including sewing machines, office equipment, carpentry tools, vehicles, projectors, public address systems, and handcuffs.

A realistic in-service training school has been established for jailer and rehabilitation cadre. Thirty-five female jailers are undergoing nurse training. Vocational schools have been started in several of the centers in carpentry, tailoring, weaving, typing, and other subjects.

Two participants have received seven months training at Southern Illinois University, and two have attended the UN school in Japan on crime, delinquency, and correction. Four more participants will be sent to Southern Illinois University in 1966. The policies of the Directorate have changed from the punitive type to the correctional type.

A primary classification system is being introduced and the entire prisoner record system has been revamped

New Centers or Correction Institutions will be more modern in design than those now in use. Few of the present Centers have proper facilities for housing prisoners. Most kitchens are dirty and in disrepair. Bathing and toilet facilities are inadequate and primitive. Sewers are almost non-existent, and those present are inadequate and usually not functioning. Most of the training buildings are "jerry-built" out of scrap material and thatch, with a few "conference rooms" available in some centers for mass reeducation.





Two new centers are under construction and two more are on the drawing board. These new centers and others planned, together with the renovation of some of the older ones now in use, will cost approximately VN\$200 million over a period of years. This amount will also include housing for personnel employed by the Directorate.

A training program for both jailers and rehabilitation cadre has been in operation since April 1964. About 100 of the 1,100 employees have already successfully completed the 30-day course. Additional personnel have been authorized and will be recruited and trained during FY 1966. Present plans call for the recruitment of at least 50 additional new employees during each of the next five years. Previously, employment requirements, both physical and mental, were extremely low. As wage levels have been quite low, few educated individuals were attracted to the service. The standards have now been raised for both jailers and cadre, and this will contribute toward a better prisoner reeducation program. New personnel meeting the higher standards are eligible for commensurately higher wages. The present cadre and jailer in-service training school will continue until all have been retrained. Pre-service schooling is planned for all new recruits. An advanced in-service training school for the more experienced jailers and cadre is in the planning stage.

Instructors have been hired for vocational training for a number of the centers and equipment for their shops is either in country or on order. These training schools for prisoners will start with basic tools and equipment, and as more instructors are provided, they will become more sophisticated and modern power equipment will be introduced. Academic subjects are taught in most centers to a limited degree, but present plans call for this program to be expanded to cover more grades, up to and including the equivalent of American high school.

In FY 1966 and FY 1967 procurement actions will be continued on a limited scale in support of rehabilitation efforts and improvement of the physical facilities. Training will continue for Rehabilitation Center personnel in various aspects of prisoner rehabilitation and prison administration.

The USAID has one Prison Advisor and plans to add one more.




Prison Rehabilitation activities in various prison centers

IN MEMORIAM


**PUBLIC SAFETY ADVISORS
WHO DIED WHILE
SERVING IN VIETNAM**



Jack Ryan
Chief of Office
1964-1965



John F. McCabe
Deputy Chief
1960-1962




Wyman W. Vernon
Deputy Chief
1959-1960



Brooks Anderson
1962-1966



Carl Alexander
1964-1966



Edward H. Forney
Brig Gen USMC (Ret)
1960-1965



Jack Wells
1965



Dolph B. Owens
1960